The purpose of this study is to improve understanding of the gold standard period in Portugal through comparison with other monetary systems that were operated afterwards. Portugal was the first country in Europe to join Great Britain in the gold standard, in 1854, and it adhered to it for quite a long time. The principle of free gold convertibility of the Portuguese currency at a fixed price was abandoned in 1891, even though the classical gold standard as an international monetary system only began to fall apart as a result of the upheavals of the First World War. For the purposes of a macroeconomic study, we can thus first look at the expansion of the functioning of the gold standard in Portugal up to 1913. In addition to a desire to share the same monetary system as its trading and financial partner, the low price of gold and the domestic circulation of British gold coins also played a part, along with other factors, in the adoption of the gold standard in Portugal. While it was in force, it provided a nominal stable anchor and a mechanism of credible commitment, even though Portugal's monetary authorities broke the "rules of the game". Our analysis points out the mistake of comparing the stability of different monetary systems with the same indicators. The application of a VAR model enabled us to isolate the period 1854-1891 as being the one that actually corresponds to what we expect of gold standard behaviour. Examination of demand, supply and monetary shocks yields interesting results that confirm the idea that the principles of classical economics are appropriate for the gold standard period. JEL Classification: B10, C32, E42, E58, F31, F33 and N23.
Introduction
At the beginning of the 19th century, the monetary laws of many countries allowed coins made from various precious metals to be minted and circulated. Such commodity-money systems are known as bimetallist standards. Gold was used for highvalue transactions, while silver, bronze or copper coins were used for the rest. Great Britain was the exception, establishing a de facto monometallic system in 1821. The German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Scandinavia, Russia and the Far East operated under the aegis of silver standards. Countries with bimetallist standards, like France, had links with the gold and silver blocs 2 .
The industrial revolution led to the emergence of Great Britain as the leading trading and industrial power in the 19 th century, and as the main source of external finance. This fact encouraged other countries to try and tighten trading relations with
Great Britain and to go to London for capital loans.
Portugal, which enjoyed strong commercial ties with the British economy, was the first European country to join Great Britain in the gold standard, in 1854, adhering to it for a considerable period, only abandoning it in 1891 3 . Portugal's adherence to the monometallic gold system lasted 37 years, longer than what is regarded as the classical gold standard period, from 1880 to 1914. Besides a desire to share the same monetary system as its chief trading partner, the low price of gold and the circulation of British gold coinage at home may also have contributed to the adoption of the gold standard in Portugal 4 .
It provided a nominal stable anchor during the period it was in operation, between July 1854 and June 1891, and it was also a mechanism of credible commitment, even though the Portuguese monetary authorities often violated the "rules of the game".
The functioning of the gold standard in Portugal was characterized by an overall picture of nominal stability, in terms of both exchange rates and prices, with product behaviour showing quite a favourable evolution in the light of the stagnation observed up to 1854 5 .
Then followed a period of monetary instability and flexible exchange rates, as a result of the suspension of the free convertibility of currency into gold at a fixed price, 2 Cf. Bordo and Schwartz (1997) and Eichengreen (1999) . 3 Cf. Reis (1995) , Mendonça (1996) and Reis (2002) . 4 Cf. Mata e Valério (1993) and Reis (2000) . 5 Cf. Reis (1995) .
a decision which was taken by all countries after 1913, when the international monetary system known as the classical gold standard began to collapse, owing to the massive shocks of the First World War.
But if Portugal was one of the first countries, along with Great Britain, to adhere to the international gold standard, it was the last European country to try restoring the full convertibility of its currency, in 1931, at a time when financial crisis was looming in Europe 6 .
This paper aims to elucidate the historical choice of the gold standard by the Portuguese authorities, and to analyse its macroeconomic behaviour. Certain performance indicators of this system are compared with the systems that followed it. With respect to comparison criteria, we would draw attention to the need to use different indicators for different systems, something that is largely ignored. We came to the conclusion in an earlier study 7 that, from the point of view of money and nominal income, the period 1854-1913 was very similar to the strict period of the gold standard.
This is why we have focused a certain amount of attention on comparing these two periods. The macroeconomic study considers the characteristics of the series used, and is based on a VAR model. We have used this model to analyse the mutual influence of the variables studied, giving prominence to examining shocks.
The data used have been taken from Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989) and Batista, Martins, Pinheiro, and Reis (1997) . The econometric program employed to process the series was RATS, version 5.04.
The paper is composed of seven points. Point 2 gives a retrospective history of how Portugal came to adhere to the gold standard and analyses some of the factors that contributed to that decision. The unique participation of the Portuguese economy in this monetary system is highlighted, bearing in mind the reasons for the emergence of the gold standard as an international monetary system. Point 3 describes the functioning of the gold standard in Portugal and examines the reasons for its collapse in June 1891. It further looks at the circumstances under which it was restored and again discarded, in the context of the international financial crisis of the 1930s. Point 4 raises the issue of the presumable evolution of prices and inflation under the gold standard, based on a very simple model by which conclusions are drawn with respect to those variables. Point 5 compares different monetary systems in Portugal and looks at the stationary behaviour of macroeconomic series. Point 6 concentrates on a description of the VAR model. It begins with the selection of the order for the two periods mentioned above, 1854-1891 and 1854-1913, to show the importance of each variable in the explanation of the others. Next, the responses of the different variables to shocks in each of them are studied. Finally, we concentrate on the gold standard period and after resolving some identification problems of the model, short-term shocks that are identified with demand, supply and money supply are studied. The last point, Point 7, concludes this work, while indicating some openings for future research.
The Process of Portugal's Adherence to the Gold Standard
The anarchy of the monetary circulation prevailing in the first half of the 19 th century 8 led to a realisation that the only way to solve the problem appeared to be a change to a monometallic system 9 . This would also be the only way to prevent the flight of silver abroad, either as a result of speculative hoarding, or through its export to countries where both official and market value were in closer alignment.
On 1 May 1854, after two years of gold depreciating against silver, the 'regenerative' government of Fontes Pereira de Melo laid a proposal for the reform of the Portuguese monetary system before the Chamber of Deputies. The proposal envisaged the resolution of Portugal's monetary problems through the establishment of a monometallic gold system, exactly like the one operating in Great Britain since 1821.
The debate went on until the second half of May, with the arguments raised being essentially technical 10 . Those opposed queried which would be the most opportune time to join the gold standard, considering that most countries, notably France, were still operating a bimetallic system. They also expressed concern that a state monopoly of silver coinage, arising from the monetary reform, could be over-used, since the purpose of gaining revenue from seigniorage and minting silver coins could lead to an increase in prices. The government's answer was to immediately exclude this possibility, backing its argument by limiting the acceptance of silver in commercial transactions.
8 Bimetallism, with the circulation of several foreign currencies in parallel with the coinage issued by the Casa da Moeda. (Portuguese mint). 9 Cf. Reis (1995) . 10 Cf. Esteves and Ferramosca (2000) .
The increase in gold production was to be absorbed by the growth in economic activity at international level, and so there should be no cause for worry. Portugal's 1854 decision to adhere to the gold standard is hardly surprising,
given the peripheral nature of the country. It displays a number of singular features that underline the importance of the choice of the moment for the changeover to the new monetary system, which can only be understood in terms of the monetary, political and economic circumstances described above. Portugal was by no means a rich industrialized country that could opt for gold for the benefits that it afforded in carrying out high-value transactions. On the contrary, it was a poor country, lacking the capacity to mint its own currency on any grand scale, and this was why its economy was largely non-monetarized 12 . Furthermore, the need to make small, frequent payments at the level of its chief productive sector, agriculture, meant that the "entrepreneurial farming class" preferred silver to gold, since it enabled it to reduce transaction costs 13 .
By adopting the gold standard early on, the country was clearly distancing itself from the prevailing tendency to demonetise gold that existed in Spain, Naples and Holland, and other states, while simultaneously excluding the option of following France's bimetallic system. The choice of the moment to institute the gold monometallic system in Portugal is also interesting in that the decision was taken almost twenty years before the leading European countries shifted to the gold standard. It was left to Germany, the second largest economic power in Europe to start this change at international level, when, in 1872, it abandoned silver in favour of gold, also as the result of monetary reform 14 .
Since they were commercially dependent on Germany and were in close geographical proximity to it, Sweden, Denmark The gold standard originally developed more or less spontaneously, for historical reasons or due to political-ideological, commercial or financial influences, at a national level on the basis of countries individual choices. Nevertheless, as the legal tender of silver lost its importance and became increasingly discarded as a monetary standard, the gold standard eventually emerged in the 1890s as the world standard, and is referred to in the literature as the classical gold standard. It ended up by operating as an authentic international monetary system between 1880 and 1914, at which time it entered into decline as a result of the shocks of the First World War 17 .
But none of the factors responsible for the emergence of the gold standard as the international monetary system quite fits the events that led to Portugal's decision in 1854 18 . If we list the chief elements that played some part in the generalized shift to 14 Cf. Gallarotti (1995) and Eichengreen and Flandreau (1995) . 15 Cf. Henriksen and Koergard (1995) . 16 The decision by France to discontinue the free minting of silver was known as "the crime of 1873". Cf. Flandreau (1996) . 17 Cf. Bordo (1993) and Bourget, Figliuzzi and Zenou (2002) . 18 Cf. Reis (1990) and Reis (1995) .
the gold standard during the 1870s and '80s, we find it hard to see that any of them were decisive in the process of Portugal's adherence to the new monetary system. Third, it is hard to see that, in the Portuguese case, the adoption of gold as a monetary standard could have been the result of being "dragged along" in the wake of certain other countries' adhesion, with others following suit. When Portugal decided to adhere to gold monometallism, only Great Britain was using this system. The fact that this country was a dominant economic power was not enough to trigger the chain reaction observed twenty years later, when most countries ended up by joining the gold standard, drawn into it by German policy or the French decision 22 .
Finally, Portugal's joining was not determined by financial reasons, which are sometimes held to be one of the main factors determining the change to gold monometallism at international level. The adoption of the gold standard could also be related to reducing the costs of loans on the international capital markets, where it would operate as a sign of financial credibility 23 . The change to a gold monometallic system would make it possible to obtain funds more cheaply on the capital markets, especially on the London market, but it would also help to overcome any problems in attracting external financing. However, there is no good reason to suppose that one of the factors responsible for Portugal's adhesion to the gold standard would have been easier access 19 Most countries would later benefit from the introduction of steam technology in the minting of coinage. Cf. Redish (1990) . 20 Cf. Reis (1995) . 21 Cf. Gallarotti (1995) and Meissner (2002) . 22 Cf. Reis (1995) , Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) and Meissner (2002) . 23 As a "good housekeeping seal of approval". Cf. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) .
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to the international capital markets; but this does not mean that it was not useful at a later stage 24 .
The problem observed in the 1850s in attracting outside finance, particularly for building railway lines, was mostly related to the lack of credit guarantees, and not really to the kind of monetary system; Spain, for instance, with its bimetallist, nonconvertible system, managed to attract more capital.
As we cannot attribute a determining role to any of the factors responsible for the emergence of the international gold standard in Portugal's decision, taken in 1854,
we have to conclude that, besides the monetary, political and economic circumstances analysed earlier, the country's adherence to the model followed by Great Britain, was encouraged by a set of specific circumstances, certain facets of which once again have considerable singularity.
First of all, the change to the new system was facilitated by (a) its low implementation cost, relative to the charges that would have resulted from the adoption of a silver monometallism, (b) the fall of the international price of gold, (c) the widespread circulation of gold coinage within Portugal, as mentioned above, and (d) the fact that there was a significant inflow of British gold coins, coming from Brazil, due to the repatriation of capital 25 . Reis (1995) , sees the 1854 decision as a consequence "of accidents of History", and a purely natural response to the monetary chaos obtaining in the Portuguese economy at the end of the 1840s. But when Portugal decided to implement the gold standard, it was already virtually governed by it, and so it was not a matter of choosing an ideal monetary system model, but, rather, a system that would be workable and with lower transaction costs. Portugal chose to follow the British model because it worked well, it could guarantee gold coinage and silver small change for carrying out large and small transactions. The relatively extensive outflow of silver in the Portuguese economy may also explain the early adherence of Portugal to the gold standard and, at the same time, the somewhat delayed adoption of it by other countries. 24 Cf. Reis (1995) . 25 Cf. Bordo and Schwartz (1995) , Reis (1995) and Mata and Valério (1993) . During the period in which the gold standard was in force in Portugal, the money supply was made up of imported British sovereigns and half-sovereigns which, contrary to other foreign gold coins, remained legal tender, but they were accepted at par and not overvalued, as had happened up to the introduction of the new monetary system. They increased considerably in number as a result of the positive balance of payments situation, due largely to loans obtained on the international market and the capital flows from emigrants' remittances 27 .
Some Features of the Functioning of the Gold Standard in Portugal
The position of Portugal in terms of external payments meant that its economy became highly dependent on the evolution of the political, social and economic situation in Brazil, and on its main financial partner, Great Britain.
Monetary dependence on the outside world was nothing new, but in the new monetary context obtaining in Portugal it began to take on greater importance 28 . Portugal was not merely before a gold standard, it was confronted by a sterling gold standard, given the key role played by the sovereign and half-sovereign in monetary circulation 29 . Among the various negative aspects that were to arise from that situation, "wounded national pride" is conspicuous, due to the possibility of the Portuguese economy becoming even more dependent on that of Britain. In addition to this, the fact that the English Mint was guided by more rigorous standards of weight and alloy in currency coinage, and that it immediately got rid of all non-standardized coins, increased fears of a possible tendency for the more worn and lighter coins to be introduced into Portugal, causing its currency reserves often to be composed of "weak" coinage 30 .
One of the most important features of the gold standard in Portugal, besides its tight relationship of monetary dependence vis-à-vis British gold coinage, was the fact that it embraced a monetary rule or mechanism of credible commitment, on the basis of which attempts were made over the years to restrict, or even sanction, the actions of the monetary authorities. The rule of maintaining a fixed price for gold in terms of national currency may be seen as a mechanism of credible commitment whose aim would be to prevent the authorities from embarking on inconsistent monetary and budgetary policies 31 .
The rule of the gold standard could also be regarded as a type of contingency rule, or a rule with escape clauses, which could be evoked in exceptional circumstances due to outside causes, beyond the responsibility of the monetary authorities. They were pledged to keep the prices of their currency fixed in terms of gold, except in the wake of clearly understood upsets, such as a major war, a severe financial crisis or a shock in terms of trade 32 .
At international level, the underlying principle consists of maintaining the free convertibility into gold at the established par value. In this context, the commitment by the various countries to maintain a fixed price for gold should have ensured fixed exchange rates. As a result, the use of monetary and budgetary policy to achieve domes- 28 In 1854 British gold coins accounted for 56% of the money supply, and in 1890, one year before the gold standard was abandoned, it comprised 74%. Cf. Sousa (1991) , Mata and Valério (1993) . 29 Cf. Reis (1995) . 30 Idem. 31 The same could be inferred for the case of Portugal making the provisions of the 1854 law its basis. Despite the persistence of successive budget deficits. Cf., among others, Bordo (1993) , Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Schwartz (1997) .
tic goals was subordinated to the maintenance of gold convertibility. Monetary policy could be used to pursue domestic aims only within the gold points which represented a system of exchange rates similar to that of target zones 33 .
In the period 1880 to 1914, exchange rate fluctuations were very small, especially in the central countries, thus revealing the high level of stability of exchange rates in the period when the classical gold standard was in operation 34 . Even though the exchange rates strayed quite often from the par value, infringements of the gold points and devaluations were nonetheless rare. With the credible adoption of gold convertibility, countries undertook to keep exchange rates stable, not to follow a policy of gradual inflation and to return to the par value for the exchange rate after any shock that temporarily forced to suspend convertibility 35 .
In the case of Portugal, the gold standard functioned well until 1891, apart from during the financial crisis of 1876, a period when the government ordered a moratorium of three months, which included a two-month suspension of gold convertibility for bank notes. The government further sought to avert the banking crisis of 1891, supporting the Bank of Portugal by supplying a million sovereigns, but to no avail. Apart from this occasion, everything seems to indicate that the principle of free gold convertibility for the Portuguese currency at a fixed price functioned without problems until 1891, when it was abandoned, even though the classical gold standard was to last until the outbreak of the First World War 36 .
For 37 years Portugal experienced a situation of fixed exchange rates, with the currency pegged to gold. The sovereign/real parity remained unchanged from 1854 to 1891 37 . This was the basis on which the gold standard monetary system in Portugal provided a stable nominal anchor and a credible commitment mechanism, even though the monetary authorities violated the gold points.
Exchange stability within the gold points was respected, by and large, while
Portugal remained within the international gold standard, although there was some foreign exchange volatility in the sovereign/real relation. This was sometimes expressed 32 Cf. Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) , Eichengreen (1994) , Bordo and Schwartz (1995) and Bordo and Kydland (1995) . 33 Target zone. Cf. Bordo and Kydland (1995) and Bordo and MacDonald (1997) . 34 Similar results were also found for the growth of the monetary base and currency stock and for longterm interest rates, which were low and stable for the same period. See Bloomfield (1959) and Bordo and Jonung (2001) . 35 Cf. Bordo and Kydland (1995) . 36 For suggestive evidence, see Bordo and Schwartz (1995) and Aceña and Reis (2000) . 37 Cf. Bordo and Schwartz (1995) .
in the breach of the import and export point of gold 38 . The gold standard in Portugal thus represented an appreciable level of exchange rate stability, and one that grew with the passage of time, as can be seen from the lower number of violations of the gold points.
However, the context of exchange rate stability afforded by the gold standard from 1860 until the end of convertibility, in June 1891, notwithstanding, the Bank of Portugal pursued an active monetary policy, with frequent violations of the "rules of the game" by only using its discount rate sporadically to maintain foreign exchange reserves 39 . This situation, aggravated by a steady exit of gold, was expressed in problems of maintaining the proportion between the fiat money and the metal reserves that
were regularly reduced at a worrying rate.
In these circumstances it was only possible to maintain the commitment mechanism to the international gold standard rule in a credible manner by continually resorting to borrowing from London, which enabled gold and gold coins to be imported in sufficient amounts to re-establish the proportion between the bank notes in circulation and the reserves guaranteeing them 40 . The use of instruments was to some extent inverted. Only in the last resource was the discount rate increased, the preferred option being foreign borrowing. In the case of the Bank of Portugal, upholding the credibility of the commitment to the Portuguese currency's gold convertibility crucially relied on cooperation between the central banks, although the monetary authorities often broke the "rules of the game".
But if the strict monetary discipline of the gold standard provided an overall picture of nominal stability, the period when Portugal adopted it was characterized by unrelenting deficits in the trade balance and persistent negative balances in the public accounts. This was not unrelated to the adoption of a number of "modernization" policies, associated with the creation of economic and social infrastructures.
Despite all this, until 1890, Portugal managed to obtain long-term loans, both at home and abroad, to cope with the trade deficit 41 . In addition, the country succeeded in 38 Cf. Esteves and Ferramosca (2000) . The violation of the export gold point is largely explained by the succession of high deficits observed in the balance of trade that had to be paid abroad. The violation of the import point seems to have been justified by the existence of a significant correspondence between the number of periods when this occurred and the movements of gold with Great Britain. The study by these authors further suggests that the width of the fluctuation band between the two points was fixed, on average, at around 2.1% of parity. The export gold point, however, was wider compared with the import gold point. 39 Cf. Reis (2002) . 40 Idem. 41 Cf. Bordo e Schwartz (1995) .
compensating for its negative trade balance by means of revenue from the remittances of emigrants in Brazil and earnings from Portuguese investments abroad, which were significant enough to achieve a series of balance of payments surpluses. In spite of
Portugal being a debtor country in terms of current transactions, it remained a regular importer of gold, unlike other peripheral countries, and this situation allowed it to sustain the credibility of its commitment to convertibility. Public accounts deficits could be financed by borrowing from the markets, with an inflow of gold sufficient to maintain convertibility also being allowed 42 .
In the long-run, meanwhile, the accumulation of these balances in the public accounts, along with those in the trade balance, made the abandoning of the gold standard inevitable when the 1890-1892 crisis struck. The early 90s were marked by a number of problems that led to a widespread lack of confidence, provoking the collapse of the Portuguese gold standard.
Brazil was undergoing a period of serious social and political instability following the abolition of slavery in 1888, and the end of the monarchy, a year later. The
Brazilian crisis had the effect of severely reducing emigrants' remittances which made it hard to prop up the gold standard system 43 . One of the factors that fed the stock of Portuguese gold thus disappeared 44 . In 1890 and 1891 alone remittances fell 20% and 40%, respectively. Portugal also got itself embroiled in a diplomatic conflict with Great Britain, which led to the British ultimatum of January 1890, while, at the same time, the Baring Brothers crisis, the Portuguese government's chief London Bank, further worsened an already delicate economic situation. The beginning of 1891 saw the recurrence of political and social instability, in the wake of a failed attempt to establish a Republic. Between January and April of that year, currency reserves fell by a half.
Added to all this, an unsuccessful attempt to issue an external loan to obtain international liquidity resulted in a run on the banks to exchange notes for gold coins;
when the monetary authorities were unable to meet this the abandoning of the gold standard was inevitable. There followed a period of monetary instability and flexible exchange rates, due to the suspension of the free gold convertibility of the currency on The gold escudo was defined as weighing 0.0739 gm of gold with a purity of 900/1000, the equivalent of a parity of 110 escudos to the pound sterling. For this, the Bank of Portugal was obliged to keep reserves of gold, foreign currency or other foreign assets convertible into gold, corresponding to at least 30% of its monetary liabilities. As the inflationary effects of the monetisation of the public deficits were still being felt, strict limits were imposed on the issue of notes intended to cover the government's financing requirements 47 .
But if Portugal was the first country to join Great Britain in adhering to the international gold standard system, it was the last to restore the full convertibility of its currency, which is once again surprising, since it was returning to gold at a time when the beginning of an exceptionally turbulent period for the functioning of the international monetary system was imminent 48 . This return raises some questions. Why did 45 Cf. Mata and Valério (1995) and Santos (1995) . 46 Idem. 47 Cf. Kock (1982) and Santos (1995) . 48 Cf. Macedo, Eichengreen and Reis (1995) , Santos (1995) and Reis (1995) .
the authorities re-establish the gold standard when the instability of the international financial situation was already clear? Why did the decision to go back to a monetary system based on gold take so long, when the escudo had been practically stable since
1924?
The full re-establishment of the convertibility of the Portuguese currency in 1931 was part of a global policy, the first step of which was to stabilize the budget.
With a political system of dictatorship and the control of the public finances firmly established, the conclusion of Salazar's reforms with a return to the gold standard was also designed to attract foreign capital, so that Portugal could face the problems of international payments 49 . Portugal was going back to gold when other countries were leaving it.
The suspension of the pound sterling's gold convertibility on 21 September After the Second World War, in 1949, the escudo was pegged to the dollar.
Even though it was only in 1962 that Portugal joined the IMF, it can still be said that it saw the same period of fixed exchange as the Bretton Woods system until the early 1970s.
49 Cf. Mata (1987) , Santos (1995) and Mata and Valério (1995) . 50 Cf. Crabbe (1989) , Bourget, Figliuzzi and Zenou (2002) and Hetzel (2002) . 51 Cf. Banco de Portugal (1932), Bordo and Santos (1995) and Santos (1995) . We move on to compare the two states of the economy that we are interested in, an economy with a convertible currency and an economy with a non-convertible currency, and analyse the consequences of the descriptions of these two states.
Inflation and Prices under the Gold Standard
In the convertible currency situation, it is reasonable to assume that prices react to demand and will be flexible in the manner β 0 = 0 52 . At the same time, we feel it is also reasonable to consider that productivity evolution in a competitive market will lead to β 0 < 0. Deflationary pressure is obvious, unless we see equation ( The two components that constitute the prices behaviour have negative values.
If prices show high flexibility, then β 1 → 1, and so δ → 0. But regardless of the situation, prices are far from displaying a unit root in their behaviour. We also see that (1.6) expresses the absence of a "buffer effect" of prices that is normally given by the inertia (0< β 0 <1) of its behaviour.
The situation in an economy with non-convertible currency is different. The parameters β C and β 0 have quite different values. We may imagine β C > 0 as a result of behaviours more remote from competitive ones. The presence of inertia in the evolution of prices that characterizes these systems can also lead to the situation of β 0 =1. As a result, in this extreme case, instead of (1.6), we now have
The rate of inflation (p t -p t-1 ) now takes a positive constant value because of the new characteristics of the economy. The presence of a unit root in price evolution is obvious.
So far we have confined our analysis to the real part of the economy. We want to introduce the monetary part. But before doing so, it is useful to clarify the signification of α c in (1.3). In fact, its value can be decomposed into α . But, in actual fact, this behaviour should only be taken in "managed currency"
systems. There is no point in considering (1.8) in convertible currency systems.
In accordance with (1.5) we can admit that in convertible currency systems prices need not necessarily fall. For that, it is enough that α C is sufficiently high. But this value in such systems may be taken as random 53 . If it depends on the production of a precious metal and the relative price structure in large economies, then in small economies we must add the international circulation of precious metals that is established in these economies. This behaviour will dictate an increased likelihood of the absence of a unit root in the behaviour of prices in small economies that are relatively open to large economies.
We may look at the case of economies whose currency is non-convertible. In this case we have the hypothesis of "managed currency" behaviour. The concept of exogenous money supply t m is now introduced, and the equality of equilibrium between money demand and supply, This behaviour highlights the positive tendency in the growth of prices as a result of decisions on the money supply that over-value full employment product growth or that over-correct foreseeable reductions in the velocity of money circulation (or by default increases in this velocity). An economy with policies geared to maintaining full employment and which penalizes restrictions on liquidity, could lead to a continuous rise in prices, as mentioned above.
We find from (1.6), (1.7) and (1.9) that the behaviour of prices is substantially different in the two systems discussed here 54 . It is interesting to note that in the case of non-convertible currency we move straightaway from prices to a regular behaviour of the rate of inflation.
As mentioned above, we conclude that there is no point in taking inflation rate characteristics, in terms of mean values and standard deviation, to compare the per-53 Which does not mean that some authors have not tried to endogenize the behaviour of the monetary supply of precious metals. See the studies by Barro (1979) , Rockoff (1984) and McCallum (1989) . 54 Despite the result found by Barsky (1987) .
formances of the two systems 55 . On the contrary, we should compare periods (or economies) within a convertible currency system using the statistical characteristics of prices and, for a non-convertible currency system, we should use the inflation rate characteristics.
We have used simulated values to illustrate the consequences of not respecting this principle. We simulated a series of 150 observations, using only the last 101 values (from 50 to 100). The series of random values, u t , was created as the probabilistic value in accordance with the Normal (0,1), for the values that are generated by a uniform distribution 56 . The price series in the convertible currency system is given by t C t u P = , and in a non-convertible currency system by . The price series show mean values equal to 100. We repeated the simulation 500 times, so that the mean price or inflation rate is the mean of these means, and the standard deviation the mean of the standard deviations. The coefficient of variation is
given by the division of this last by the value obtained for the mean. The values are found in Table 1 . As we can see, the system to be regarded as the most stable depends on the kind of variable chosen for comparison. If we take the inflation rate, though with a lower mean of inflation rates, the convertible currency system shows the highest value for the coefficient of variation. The relative uncertainty is thus much greater in convertible systems. Precisely the opposite is found if we take prices. The most stable system now is that of currency convertibility. It does not make sense to compare the gold standard with the later systems on the basis of the same variable, that is, the inflation rate, as 55 Lee Craig and Spencer (1995) draw attention to the phenomenon of international integration of prices under the gold standard, linking it to a lower rate of inflation. This integration does not take the same form with national non-convertible currency. 56 In terms of the RATS econometric program, u = %invnormal (%uniform(0,1)).
lowing the earlier results obtained by Basrky (1987) . In the same way as the test by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992) on the growth of the persistence of the gold standard inflation for the following systems is deprived of meaning.
The Gold Standard in Portugal: some indicators

General Indicators
The characterization of the gold standard period in Portugal is displayed in a comparative form in Tables 2 and 3 The results are not very different from those found in Cooper (1982 ), Bordo (1993 , Bordo and Santos (1995) and Bordo and Jonung (2001) . Although the rate of inflation was lower during the first period (0.2%), the standard deviation for inflation reached a higher value during the gold standard than during Bretton Woods.
However, as we have said, the comparison in terms of nominal stability 57 , where the gold standard is concerned, should be made using prices, and not the inflation rate.
Bearing this in mind, we can see how the gold standard period was one of great price stability. Its standard deviation was 1/3 of that occurring during B-W. As we expected, product growth was substantially greater during B-W, at almost 5% as against nearly 2%, during the gold standard. There was also less product stability during this period 58 . With respect to the money supply, we should note lower growth under the gold standard and instability of such growth in the period following Bretton Woods. In short, we may conclude that the nominal stability during the gold standard contrasts with the real stability of the Bretton Woods period.
Series Stationarity Study
Before moving on to the study of the modelling of the gold standard period, we should examine the characteristic of stationarity of the series involved. Graham et al. (1996) and DFGLU, in accordance with Elliot (1999) . In the KPSS test we used the lags obtained in the first ADF test that eliminate the auto-correlation problem by means of the LM test. The asterisks have the usual meaning of rejection of H0, *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, except for the KPSS test, where *** means nonrejection of stationarity at 10%.
The results are given in Tables 4 and 5 , below.
57 Accepting that prices are stationary. 58 Reis (2000) mentions the phenomenon of real instability in periphery countries during the gold standard as reflecting the asymmetry of this system. 59 Statistics t ρ = 1 and N⋅ (ρ -1), where N is the number of observations. Cf. Dickey and Fuller (1979) , Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) . 60 Cf. D. Kwiatkowski and Shin (1992) . As we shall see, special care is taken with the stationarity of the models obtained.
61 Since the first difference for Product and Money are stationary variables. 62 Which means that we are estimating a VECM model.
A VAR model for 1854-91 and 1854-1913
Moving on to the study of a VAR model with Product (Q), Prices (P) and Money (M) 63 , the model considered is of the type A (L) ⋅x t = A 0 + e t (2.1) where
is the vector of the endogenous variables, A (L) the matrix of coefficients of the phase differences of x t , A 0 the vector of the model's constants, and e t the vector of errors with the normal I.I.D. characteristics.
To select the order for the VAR model we used Akaike, (
as well as a
likelihood ratio test (LR) in accordance with the correction proposed by Sims (1980) .
The values obtained are given in Table 6 . The value in brackets in the "LR" column is the significance level of the value of χ 2 of order 9. As we can see, those two indicators and the LR test point in the same direction:
reject K = 4 against K = 3, K = 3 against K = 2 and finally K = 2 against K = 1. The model that we are going to retain is thus of order 1. As Table 7 shows, the root modules are below the unit, and so the model is stationary.
63 Q represents the per capita GDP at 1990 prices; P the implicit deflator of GDP 100 in 1990; and M represents the per capita M1 monetary stock. All the variables have been converted into logarithms. 64 Where N, k UR and K represent the number of observations, the number of parameters for each equation of the unconstrained model and the VAR order, respectively. Employing the Choleski decomposition, we estimated the error variance decomposition of each variable in terms of their individual contribution. The results for the fiftieth observation are given in Table 8 . We have to stress the influence of Product and Prices on Product and Prices.
Money plays little part in explaining the errors of these variables. Note, too, the importance of Money and Product on Money itself. This behaviour may be explained by the fact that, in fact, the money is based on the production of metal and on fiduciary behaviour, which latter is dictated by the evolution of production.
The Study of Shocks on the Model Variables
Continuing with the Choleski decomposition, we show in Figures 1 and 2 below the effects of shocks (standard deviation of each estimation) on each variable 65 .
As the models estimated are stationary (Table 7) , the impulses resulting from shocks tend to become null with the passage of time. Analysis of these models should therefore lead us to choose a maximum period for which we can carry out a study on the effects of such shocks. For this we have chosen a period of ten years.
Graphic analysis of the effects of shocks shows some similarities, but also differences, in the two models.
A shock to a Product:
⎯ has immediate deflationary effects, but after 3 or 4 years the effect is virtually null; 65 We used the RATS monteva2.prg program, which applies the methodology indicated in Sims and Zha (1999) . Below, another RATS program is used, montezha.prg, applying the same methodology to the case of an above-identified model.
⎯ has long-lasting effects on Product and Money. After 10 years Product and Money still register 1/3 and 36% of the percentage value of the shock on the Product, in the first model, and 27% and 30% in the second model 66 . We can see what is happening when there is a shock to Prices:
Shock of
⎯ its effects on Product and Money are important. After 10 years these variables still registered 39% and 42% of the percentage value of the shock on Prices, in the first model, and 44% and 20%, in the second model; ⎯ its effects on Prices themselves are very different in the two models. In the first model, at the end of the 10 year period, the effect is 0.16% of the initial shock, and in the second it is 22%. We may say, then, that in one case the effects were nullified quickly, while in the other this took longer. Finally, we can look at the reactions to a monetary shock:
⎯ in both models, the effects on Prices vanish very quickly, while on Product and Money they are more persistent. After 10 years, the effects on these last two variables are 4.1% and 4.5% of the initial percentage shock on Money, in the first model, and 2% and 5%, in the case of the second model, respectively;
⎯ the deflationary effect of a growth of money, in the second model, is odd, to say the least, especially in the years close to the shock.
The results found for shocks to products can also be regarded as increases in the demand for coined metal, and the results obtained here are in agreement with the analysis by Barro (1979) and McCallum (1989) , for the short-term, and also with Rockoff (1984) , from the long-term perspective.
Two differences in the behaviour of the two models should be stressed: the effects of Price shock on Prices themselves, and the effects of a Money shock on Prices.
In the model restricted to the gold standard: the effects on Prices of a shock to Prices themselves are quickly annulled -which does not happen in the other model; and a shock to Money has positive effects on Prices, which, however, tend to disappear quickly -while in the other model, we find deflationary effects 67 . Another feature of shocks, in either model, relates to the fact that, in the first model, Product variations are always accompanied by slightly higher Money variations, which does not happen in the second model. This behaviour ought to mean that in a small economy, like that of Portugal, the positive evolution of a Product is accompanied by a Money evolution motivated by a requirement related to circulation or even reserves (or net wealth held).
Having analysed the impulses on variables, in the two models, it seems to us that they indicate a confirmation of gold standard behaviours in the case of the first model, that is, in the case of the model restricted to the exclusive gold standard period.
This is why our analysis now on focuses solely on this period, and thus on the first 
Analysis of Supply, Demand and Monetary Shocks
These results may be regarded as confirming the classical hypothesis of supply shocks (ε S,t ) which overwhelmingly affect the product and demand shocks (ε D,t ), or monetary shocks (ε M,t ), which are exerted on prices and not on production. The errors of equation (2.1), instead of presenting the usual structure in a Choleski decomposition, The likelihood ratio test leads to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis for a constraint implied in Equation (2.5), its value was χ 2 = 0.598 (0.439), where the respective significance level is in brackets.
Using the above decomposition, we again supposed shocks of the magnitude of the standard deviations associated with the estimation of the model. The results are given in Figure 3 . 68 Sims-Bernanke decomposition. Cf. Bernanke (1986) . 70 Dibooglu (1998) , using a model of a similar type to that used here, supports the temporary growth of the effectiveness of demand shocks, which eventually accompanied the evolution of monetary systems. 71 Which seems to support those who defend convertible systems as a way of achieving price stability. Cf. Dowd (1993) .
Shock of
quickly converge to symmetrical values, nullifying any effect of these shocks in the medium term.
Better confirmation of the appropriate application of the principles of the classical economics of the gold standard would be impossible to find. But this does not mean that we would uphold the old notion of the equilibrium and smoothness of such a system 72 . In our ideas and, why not say so, too, in our culture, demand policies and monetary policies hold an important position. Indeed, they either had harmful effects under the gold standard, or they had no significant impact at all. It seems to us that Mundell (1995) and Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) are equally correct when they attribute the disasters of inappropriate policies to the policies themselves, or to the actual system. The gold standard did not allow the use of the policies we have seen above. It was able to exist because it corresponded to the political consensus of those represented in the governments that really held power 73 .
Conclusion
Thirty-seven years of convertibility, apart from the three-month moratorium in 1876, demonstrate, for a peripheral country like Portugal, that the adoption of the gold standard in 1854, alone in following the example of Great Britain, was the right decision, and a practical one, given the chaos of the country's monetary situation. Even though the factors that motivated it were obviously different from those which, two decades later, led most other countries to adhere to the disciplinary rigour of that monetary system.
Remittances from emigrants and the ability to borrow on the markets enabled Portugal to become a net importer of gold, which was a crucial factor for maintaining the gold convertibility of the Portuguese currency. All this came to an end in 1891, when the country was unable to secure loans abroad and its monetary reserves were extremely depleted, largely thanks to the crisis in Brazil, the source of most of the emigrants' earnings, and the monetary authorities had no choice but to adopt a system of a flexible exchange rate for non-convertible paper money.
Portugal returned to gold in 1931, but at a devalued parity. In any case, this return lasted a brief 82 days. As had happened in 1891, suspension of convertibility again resulted from an international financial crisis. This act demonstrated the willing- 72 The classical position of Bloomfield (1959) on these aspects is well known.
ness of the authorities to peg the monetary unit to international benchmark currencies in an effort to achieve a situation of macroeconomic stability. But times had changed and so had the requirements of economic policy. Our work has shown that it would have been impossible for that system to continue. 
